Complaints about Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Potential Use of Mediation by Wells, Ian & Field, Rachael
  
 
COVER SHEET 
 
 
 
This is the author-version of article published as: 
 
Wells, Ian and Field, Rachael (2003) “Complaints about Australian 
Intelligence Organisations and the Potential Use of Mediation”. QUT 
Law and Justice Journal 3(2):pp. 349-366. 
 
 
Accessed from   http://eprints.qut.edu.au
 
© 2003 Queensland University of Technology 
    
 
Complaints About Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Potential 
Use of Mediation 
 
Ian Wells 
Rachael Field1
 
 
Introduction 
 
Public complaints about the operations of the Australian Intelligence Community 
(AIC)2 are increasing.  The Inspector-General of Intelligence Services (IGIS) 
reported in 2002 that “the number of complaints leading to preliminary or full 
inquiries more than doubled from the previous reporting year”.3  This increase in 
complaints has been identified as not reflective of “any lowering of standards by 
the agencies”,4 but rather as resulting from a number of external factors which 
have “raised public consciousness of intelligence and security matters”.5  For 
example, the rise in global terrorism and consequential increase in AIC activity, 
heightened media publicity about Intelligence issues, and public debate about 
related controversial federal legislation, including counter-terrorism proposals.6
 
                                                 
1   Dr Ian Wells, BA (Hons) (Flinders), PhD (Flinders) Lecturer, School of Justice Studies, Faculty of Law, 
Queensland University of Technology.  Rachael Field, BA/LLB (Hons) (ANU) LLM (Hons) (QUT) Grad Cert 
Ed (Higher Ed) (QUT) Barrister and Solicitor (ACT) Solicitor (Qld), Lecturer, School of Justice Studies, 
Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology.  The authors would like to express their appreciation 
for the helpful comments of the anonymous referee.   
2   Whilst there are a number of other intelligence agencies in the law enforcement field for the purposes of 
this article the term AIC incorporates only the Australian national intelligence agencies as defined by s.3 of 
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1986 (Cth) (the Act). These organisations include:  
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Defence 
Signals Directorate (DSD), Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), Defence Intelligence 
Organisation (DIO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).  
3   W Blick, (2002) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2001 – 2002, 
Commonwealth of Australia at 11 available at www.igis.gov.au – hereafter referred to as the IGIS Annual 
Report.  
4   IGIS Annual Report at 17. 
5   IGIS Annual Report at 16. 
6  See the Intelligence Services Act, 2001 (Cth) and proposed amendments to the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act, 1979 (Cth). 
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The reality of the current global environment, and the strength of presence of the 
threat of terrorism, means that activity on the part of the AIC is likely to remain at 
increased levels for some time.7  With this comes increased interaction with the 
public and as a result the potential for greater numbers of complaints. 
 
This article considers the way in which complaints about the AIC are currently 
dealt with through the office of the IGIS and looks at the possibility of 
incorporating mediation into the IGIS’ complaints resolution practice.  The current 
mode of handling complaints is formal, resource intensive and involves limited 
participation by both agencies and complainants.  Whilst this system ostensibly 
holds the AIC accountable, it does not necessarily lead to complainant or agency 
satisfaction with the process or outcome.  The contemporary complaints 
environment therefore offers significant potential for an increase in the use of 
informal dispute resolution methods such as mediation.  This is because informal 
processes offer greater opportunities for transparency in AIC agency 
accountability, resource savings, efficiency, flexibility, and increased participation 
on the part of complainants and agencies. 
 
Part 1 - The Role of the IGIS and Current Complaints Resolution Practice 
 
1.1  The Role of the IGIS 
 
The IGIS is the key statutory office for the resolution of complaints against 
Australia’s Intelligence agencies.   The office was established in 1987 to help 
ministers responsible for Intelligence organisations to “oversee and review their 
activities”.8  A part of this process is responding to a complaint about an agency, 
                                                 
7   Note the statement, for example, in ASIO’s 2002-2006 Corporate Plan that:  “The 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks have changed the security situation internationally and for Australia.  We face heightened 
levels of threat, and more broadly, a diverse and volatile international and regional environment.  At the 
same time we face challenges arising from rapid technological change, particularly in telecommunications 
and information technology.” – available at www.asio.gov.au/Publications. 
8   IGIS Annual Report at 8. 
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although as the IGIS notes in his9 2001-2002 Annual report, “in recent years 
inspection of the activities of the collection agencies (ASIO, ASIS, DSD and 
DIGO) has occupied the bulk of the effort of the office.”10  
 
The types of complaints received by the IGIS from members of the public include, 
for example, “allegations of unlawful ‘bugging’ of telephones, inappropriate 
surveillance, delays in security assessments of asylum seekers and 
inappropriate involvement in court matters.”11  Complaints made to the IGIS can 
include complex factual and emotional issues to do with an agency’s conduct 
against a complainant.  Complaints often concern a complainant’s privacy and 
personal security.  They can range from potential breaches of the law to matters 
where the complainant has taken offence at an agency officer’s actions or 
conduct. 
 
The complaints resolution role of the IGIS is not dissimilar to that of a specialist 
ombudsman.  Characteristics that the IGIS shares with other ombudsmen 
include; being generally a point of last administrative resort, operating free from 
strict rules of evidence, having a role of significant influence, and sharing a 
commitment to fairness, responsiveness, and accountability.12  Currently 
complaints from the public are received, investigated and concluded by the IGIS 
in a way that fits classical models of dealing with administrative complaints.13    
 
1.2  Current IGIS Complaints Process 
 
                                                 
9   The current IGIS is Mr Bill Blick.  He was appointed to the office in February 1998. 
10    IGIS Annual Report at 10. 
11   See www.igis.gov.au/complaints.  See also the Annual Reports of the office of the IGIS for details of 
complaints dealt with by the IGIS. 
12   D Bevan (2002) “Address to Student Ombudsmen Conference”, Paper presented at the 3rd Australasian 
Conference of Ombuds and Deans of Students in Higher Education, QUT Brisbane, 14 February 2002 at 2 
available at www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman.html at 10. 
13   See, for example, W Wade and C Forsythe (2000) Administrative Law (8th edition) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, A Ardagh, (1999) Administrative Law, (4th ed) Sydney: Butterworths, M Allars (1997) 
Australian Administrative Law – Cases and Materials, Sydney: Butterworths, Chapter 6 at 300, and R 
Tomasic and D Fleming (1991) Australian Administrative Law, Sydney: The Law Book Company, Chapter 3 
at 265.  See also, MP Rowe, (1991) “The Ombudsman’s Role in a Dispute Resolution System” 7(4) 
Negotiation Journal 353. 
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Complaints to the IGIS must be made in writing.14  Preliminary inquiries, which 
are relatively informal, are used to establish jurisdiction over a complaint and 
whether the matter warrants further consideration.15  The preliminary inquiry 
process is relatively successful, with 20 of the 26 new complaints made in 2001 – 
2002 being finalised at this stage.   
 
In deciding whether a complaint should be fully investigated the IGIS will take 
into account a number of factors.  These include, “how long ago the events which 
led to the complaint occurred, whether the agency concerned has conducted or 
is conducting a review of its own, whether the matter should be referred 
elsewhere, and whether the matter is serious enough to warrant investigation.”16  
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1986 (Cth) (the Act) 
provides the IGIS with a discretion not to proceed with an investigation where 
“the complainant became aware of the action more than 12 months before the 
complaint was made”,17 where “the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or was not 
made in good faith”,18 or where “having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case” an inquiry is deemed unwarranted.19  
   
Where the IGIS decides to commence an inquiry the Act requires him to inform 
the responsible Minister and the head of the relevant agency.20    The IGIS is 
given a wide discretion as to the conduct of investigations with the Act providing 
that inquiries shall be conducted in private and “in such a manner as the IGIS 
sees fit.”21   
 
                                                 
14   Pursuant to s.10 of the Act a complaint may be made orally or in writing, however where it is made orally 
the IGIS shall either put the complaint in writing or require the complainant to do so.  In the event that the 
complainant refuses to put the complaint in writing the IGIS has the discretion to refuse to inquire into the 
complaint further. 
15   See s.14 of the Act. 
16   See www.igis.gov.au/complaints. 
17   S.11(2)(a) of the Act. 
18   S. 11(2)(b) of the Act. 
19   S.11(2)(c) of the Act. 
20   S.15 of the Act. 
21   S.17(1) of the Act. In 2001-2002 6 new full inquiries were completed. 
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Investigations typically involve discussions with, and briefings from, the relevant 
agency, inspection of files and documents, and interviews with people involved 
with the substance of the complaint.22  The IGIS has the power under the Act to 
access information and documents23 and to enter agency premises24 for the 
purposes of inquiries, and also to consult with the relevant Minister or the Prime 
Minister before completing an inquiry.25   
 
Once an investigation is complete the IGIS prepares a draft report in which his 
conclusions and recommendations are set out.26  This draft report is provided to 
the relevant agency for its comment and response.  A final report is then 
prepared.  This is provided to the agency and the complainant is given a written 
advice of the outcome.27  If the complaint is considered justified the IGIS may 
make recommendations for correcting the problem identified through the 
complaint and consult with the relevant agency head and the responsible 
Minister.28  If the IGIS does not uphold the complaint the complainant receives a 
written explanation.29   
 
The existence of the office of the IGIS is a significant contribution to 
accountability and appropriate complaints handling in relation to Australian 
Intelligence organisations.30  The office’s processes and procedures are, 
however, quite formal and exclude face-to-face active participation in the 
resolution of a complaint by a representative of the relevant agency and the 
complainant.   
                                                 
22   The Act specifically states that the IGIS is under no compulsion to interview anyone including the 
complainant in relation to a complaint – s.17(3). 
23   S. 18 of the Act. 
24   S.19 of the Act. 
25   S.17 ss(7) and (8) of the Act. 
26   S.21(1) of the Act.  Under s.21(2) any comments of the head of the agency should be included in the 
final report. 
27   See s.22 and s.23 of the Act. 
28   “The IGIS can recommend that an agency reconsider or change a decision, change its rules or 
procedures, or pay compensation for any loss that has been suffered as a result of its decisions or actions.” : 
see www.igis.gov.au/complaints. 
29   S.23 of the Act. 
30   H McComas (2002) “’Quis custodies custodiet?’ Who will guard the guardians?  Accountability in 
Intelligence”  10(2) Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 31 at 32-33. 
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In the contemporary security environment the public is likely to become more and 
more concerned with the operations and practice of Intelligence organisations. 
An increasingly sensitive public may also take greater issue with Intelligence 
organisation activity.   It is this context in which complaints resolution practice 
might be used as an opportunity for public awareness raising and education on 
issues relevant to AIC activity, and to create a cooperative environment between 
the public and the AIC.  It seems appropriate then to consider developing more 
informality and inclusivity, where possible, of both AIC agencies and 
complainants in the complaints resolution processes employed by the IGIS.   
 
The following section outlines how the informal dispute resolution process of 
mediation might be used more frequently by the IGIS to resolve complaints and 
also to foster greater public cooperation and confidence in the work of the AIC. 
 
Part 2 – Mediation and the Resolution of Complaints About Intelligence 
Organisations 
 
There are a number of reasons why the option of mediation as a formal inclusion 
in the processes available to the IGIS under the Act should be considered.  First, 
as was noted above, informal dispute resolution processes promote the bringing 
of parties to a complaint together and this can assist in the development of 
transparent and accountable practice and procedure on the part of Australian 
Intelligence organisations.  This principle has already been endorsed at an 
agency level as being in the interests of Australia’s security operations.31  
Second, mediation, as a consensual dispute resolution process that is based on 
                                                 
31   For example, ASIO made the statement in a submission to the Parliamentary Committee on ASIO that: 
“ASIO seeks to provide as much information to the public as possible, within the constraints of security and 
resources.”: Submission to the Parliamentary Committee on ASIO (2000) An inquiry into the nature, scope 
and appropriateness of the way in which ASIO reports to the Australian public on its activities 5 July at 6.  
Note also the following comment that:  “… the good guys – that is, the forces of law enforcement and 
intelligence – have to expose themselves to a level of public accountability which may in some small way 
hinder their effectiveness.  But that is the balance that we insist on in a democratic society.” – N Waters 
(2000) Australian Privacy Charter Council, Transcript of Evidence, 17 July at 29. 
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developing understanding and enhancing communication, promotes principles of 
justice that are key to public perceptions of good government.32 Third, mediation 
is an efficient and economically sound dispute resolution option for government 
agencies.  As the Queensland Ombudsman has acknowledged, formal modes of 
investigation of administrative complaints “are resource intensive and are not 
always the most effective way of achieving a satisfactory outcome for the 
complainant and the agency.”33
 
Pearce has also identified a number of reasons why informal dispute resolution 
practice is important in administrative and government contexts.  These reasons 
include: the speed with which matters can be processed, accessibility, cost-
effectiveness, and the non-threatening nature of such processes for the 
participants.34   
 
It is acknowledged that the use of preliminary inquiries by the IGIS is already a 
positive practice allowing greater informality and efficiency in the resolution of 
matters.35  This article is focused however on the introduction of a particular 
model of dispute resolution procedure, mediation, which would involve bringing 
complainants face-to-face with a representative of the relevant agency, where 
their discussions about the complaint would be facilitated by an appropriately 
trained officer from the office of the IGIS.  
 
2.1 Mediation and the Offfice of the IGIS 
 
                                                 
32   L Boulle (1996) Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice, Sydney: Butterworths at 62.  
33   Bevan (2002) at 8. 
34   D Pearce (1993) “The Ombudsman: review and preview the importance of being different” 11 
Ombudsman Journal 13-36 at 14. 
35  Menkel-Meadow has acknowledged that ombuds activity (particularly in terms of processes used for 
preliminary inquiries) is a hybrid of mediation:  C Menkel-Meadow (2001) Mediation Dartmouth: Ashgate at 
xxx.  Bevan has commented that preliminary inquiries conducted by ombuds can amount in some instances 
to a form of shuttle mediation: Bevan (2002) at 8. 
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Whilst there has certainly been a recent emphasis on alternative methods of 
dispute resolution such as mediation across public and private spheres,36 it is not 
true to say that mediation is at all novel.  Justice Kirby (amongst others) has 
pointed out that "for centuries, priests, lawyers and other citizens have helped to 
mediate disputes."37   
 
A mediator is essentially a peace-maker and intermediary who assists in 
resolving a dispute before resort to an adjudicator for a final decision is 
necessary.38  The mediation process aims to allow disputants an opportunity to 
discuss their concerns, explain their views and explore options for resolution in a 
confidential, open and neutral environment. 39  It is a process that is generally 
considered economically and resource efficient, whilst catering to the human side 
of dispute resolution.40   It is therefore a very suitable option for an office such as 
that of the IGIS which we predict will be dealing with increasing numbers of 
emotive complainants, some of whom may simply need a forum in which to have 
their “story” heard or acknowledged, and an opportunity to better understand AIC 
practices.  
 
Mediation has been variously defined and there are a number of different models 
that are applied in various contexts.41  Differences in these models are usually 
based on the final goal of the process.  For example, therapeutic mediation has the 
goal of reconciling the parties and resolving the underlying causes of their conflict; in 
                                                 
36   For example, the Family Court of Australia has led the way in attempts to institutionalise alternative dispute 
resolution procedures.  See the Courts (Mediation and Arbitration) Act, 1991 (Cth) which introduced 
amendments to the Family Law Act, 1975 (Cth) to include mediation in the Court's processes.  Further 
amendments to the Family Law Act enacted in 1996 also encourage the use of alternatives to litigation. 
37  M Kirby (1992) "Mediation - Current Controversies and Future Directions" 3 Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 139 at 140.  
38   S Charlesworth (1991) "Still Waiting in the Wings - Mediation and the Legal Profession" 65 Law Institute 
Journal 59. Mediation can be seen as both “an ideology (of peace-seeking, transformative conflict-resolving 
human problem-solving) and a practice (of task-oriented, communication enhancing dispute resolution).”:  
Menkel-Meadow (2001) at xvii. 
39  Department of Justice and Attorney-General, QLD, Alternative Dispute Resolution Division, Annual Report 
1994-1995 at 12. 
40   S Roberts (1992)  "Mediation in the Lawyers' Embrace" 55 Modern Law Review 258 at 259.   
41   Numerous writers acknowledge the definitional problems associated with mediation.  See for example, H 
Astor and C Chinkin (2002) Dispute Resolution in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths: Australia at 135-136, 
and Boulle (1996) at 3-4. 
  8
    
this model mediators are facilitative and take on what might be considered a 
counsellor role.  Evaluative mediation has the goal of reaching a settlement between 
the parties based on their legal rights; in this model mediators are interventionist and 
advisory.42
 
In terms of developing a model of mediation that is appropriate for use by the IGIS it 
seems appropriate to focus on the traditional philosophical basis of the process, 
namely, skilful facilitation of direct participation in consensus dispute resolution by 
the parties to a dispute.43   
 
Sir Laurence Street has identified three fundamental principles of mediation that 
relate to this philosophical foundation.  First, mediation "originates in an agreement 
between the disputants to call in the aid of a facilitator to assist in the structuring and 
conduct of settlement negotiations".   This means, in the context of complaints made 
to the IGIS, that both the agency and the complainant need to agree to using the 
process, and need to be committed to using it constructively.44  There would be no 
compulsion to proceed, for example, if an agency had any concerns about 
participating in a mediation and advised that formal inquiries would be a more 
appropriate avenue for the resolution of a particular complaint.  Secondly, "the 
facilitator has no authority to impose a solution on a disputant as does a judge, 
arbitrator, or expert appraiser".  This means that the mediation is unsuccessful if the 
agency and the complainant do not reach an agreement themselves.  In this event, 
the usual formal processes of the IGIS’s complaints resolution practice would be 
invoked.  Thirdly, "the whole process remains at all times entirely flexible and 
dependent upon the continuing willingness of the disputants to continue it until such 
time as either they themselves agree upon the terms of settlement or one or other of 
them terminates the negotiations; it is, in short, consensus-oriented."45
                                                 
42   See Boulle (1996) at 28-30. 
43  L Street, (1994) "The Philosophy of Mediation", Paper Presented at the Fifth International Criminal Law 
Conference, 25-30 September, Sydney at 2. 
44   See Astor and Chinkin (2002) at 158 – 160 on the issue of the importance of capacity and willingness of 
parties to participate in the process. 
45  L Street,  (1992) "The Language of Alternative Dispute Resolution" 3 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 
144 at 146. 
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2.2 A Proposed Model of Mediation for Use by the IGIS 
 
On the basis of this underlying philosophy, a process is proposed below for use 
in the resolution of complaints about AIC activity by the IGIS.  It is a model based 
on that used by the Dispute Resolution Centres in Queensland that operate 
through the Department of Justice and Attorney-General’s Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Branch.46  This model is a facilitative model of mediation which 
involves interest-based problem solving,47 the main objective of which is “to 
avoid positions and negotiate in terms of the parties’ underlying needs and 
interests instead of their strict legal entitlements.”48  The principal role of the 
mediator in this model is to “conduct the process, and maintain a constructive 
dialogue between the parties.”49
 
Implementation of the model proposed here would involve amendments to the Act 
based on the Dispute Resolution Centres Act, 1990 (Qld) (DRC Act).  Under the 
model mediation sessions would be conducted with as little formality and technicality, 
and with as much expedition as possible, and the rules of evidence would not 
apply.50  As indicated above, participation in the process would be voluntary for all 
parties.51  Mediation sessions would be privileged and secret, with assurances of 
confidentiality being provided via legislative provision in amendments to the Act.52  
Participating in a mediation would also not affect the complainant’s or the agency’s 
legal rights or remedies in relation to the substance of the complaint.53
 
                                                 
46 Mediations conducted by the Centres take place pursuant to the Dispute Resolution Centres Act, 1990 
(Qld).  Hereafter referred to as the DRC Act. 
47   For more detail on interest-based problem solving techniques see R Fisher and W Ury (1999) Getting to 
Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In, London: Random House. 
48   Boulle (1996) at 29. 
49   Boulle (1996) at 30. 
50  S.29 (2) and (3) of the DRC Act. 
51  S.31(1) and (2) of the DRC Act. 
52  S. 36(4) and (5) of the DRC Act provide that documents prepared for the purposes of a mediation, and 
evidence of anything said or of any admission made in a mediation session is not admissible in any proceedings 
before any court, tribunal or body, except where the parties agree.  S.37 provides that mediators must take an 
oath or affirmation of secrecy. 
53   S.31(4) of the DRC Act. 
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The proposed model54 would begin with the mediator giving a detailed introduction 
to the principles and practice of mediation and establishing a number of ground rules 
for the participants.55  In particular, the mediator would emphasise their 
independence and the fact that they will not make a decision in relation to the 
complaint.  Importantly, in the context of the IGIS’s office, an officer who works as 
the mediator on a matter would not then be able to conduct an investigation into that 
same matter if the mediation were unsuccessful.   
 
Once the mediation commences the complainant and the agency would each be 
given the opportunity to explain their concerns and issues in relation to the complaint 
without interruption.  The mediator would then summarise these concerns and 
issues in objective, neutral language and help to construct an agenda to provide a 
focus for communication between the participants.  This agenda is used by the 
mediator to systematically assist the participants to communicate directly with each 
other and to explore each of the issues.  It should be emphasised, that in this 
process of exploration, because of the flexibility of the process, if an agency 
becomes concerned about whether they can discuss a particular matter, it is 
possible for a break to be taken and for further advices or authority to be sought. 
 
A private session also usually takes place after all the issues on the agenda have 
been explored.  In this session the mediator meets with each party privately to 
discuss their perspective on progress in the mediation.  This session is confidential 
and gives each participant an opportunity to speak freely and openly to the mediator 
about any concerns they may have about the process, its conduct, or the 
participation of the other party.   
 
                                                 
54  This process follows, in basic terms, the 7 stage process for mediation outlined by J Folberg and A Taylor 
(1984) Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflict Without Litigation San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
The process is based on a two-mediator cooperative model but can be used by solo mediators also.   
55   For example, that only one person speaks at a time, or that appropriate language is to be used.  Folberg 
and Taylor also list a number of behavioural guidelines that should be established prior to a mediation 
commencing, for example, agreement on time-frames for the session, rules preventing attribution of motives 
or slanderous statements, rules regarding interruptions, procedures for taking breaks etc:  (1984) at 157.  
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Private sessions also provide an opportunity for the agency representative to 
canvass security issues that may be relevant to the conduct of the mediation.  And 
at this point the agency representative would be in a position to “reality-test” with the 
mediator whether the agency is going to be able to meet the needs or demands of 
the complainant.  For example, an agency representative could consider the 
feasibility of proposing possible policy changes to their organisation’s operational 
practice, or develop a recommendation for a direction to the agency’s officers about 
conduct when on operations.  The flexibility of the mediation process also allows 
agency representatives time to consult with their organisation on such changes. 
 
Negotiations between the participants continue after the private sessions with the 
mediator assisting them to focus on developing options for reaching consensus on 
resolving the complaint.  These options are explored and, finally, proposals between 
the participants are crystallised (usually but not necessarily) with a written 
agreement and closing statements from the mediator. 
 
Part 3:  Knowing When Mediation is Appropriate for Complaints Made to the 
IGIS 
 
A critical issue for the success of mediation as an approach to complaints against 
the AIC will be the selection of appropriate complaints for diversion to the mediation 
process.56  Clearly the model of mediation proposed here will not be appropriate for 
the resolution of all matters that come to the IGIS.  In particular, allegations of 
illegality in the operations of an agency should be formally investigated and, in some 
instances even referred on to the police.57  Issues, for example in relation to warrant 
operations, procedures and violations, or unauthorised telephone interception, 
involve concerns about legal propriety that relate to public confidence in the 
                                                 
56   Folberg and Taylor comment that “mediation can be applied to diverse conflicts and disputes … the uses 
of mediation as a participatory, problem-solving approach are infinite.” (1984) at 190 – 191. 
57   For example, see the IGIS Annual Report at 44 where a complaint is detailed that included allegations 
against ASIO of property theft.  This was referred by the IGIS, with the agreement of the Director-General of 
ASIO, to the police with supervision by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
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operations of the AIC.  Complaints about these sorts of issues require formal 
investigations with formal, public conclusions and action.   
 
Intelligence organisations will also be concerned that the mediation process does 
not have the potential to compromise security. In the case of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) for example, these concerns generally focus on 
where information could compromise modus operandi, prejudice current operations, 
reveal the existence or identity of past or current sources, agents and ASIO officers 
or endanger foreign liaison.58   
 
The office of the IGIS would need to develop a screening process that would ensure, 
for example, that matters pertaining to issues of illegality or matters that are 
potentially sensitive in terms of security, are simply never recommended for 
mediation.  These matters would follow the usual formal inquiry processes outlined 
above in Part 1. 
 
Not all complaints received by the IGIS relate, however, to action on the part of an 
agency that is illegal; and not all complaints involve issues where an agency’s 
participation in a mediation will compromise organisational or national security.  
Justified grievances may equally well arise, for example, where an agency “has 
acted inconsiderately or unfairly or where it has misled the complainant or treated 
the complainant badly.”59  Matters of this kind might include mistakes of judgment in 
complying with collection or reporting guidelines or with the new privacy rules,60 or 
inappropriate conduct in investigations on the part of agency officers.  For example, 
allegations of violating the modesty of Muslim women were made in relation to a 
joint ASIO/AFP operation where a woman in a house being raided was not allowed 
to put on a head scarf during the raid.61
                                                 
58   ASIO Annual Report 1997-98 at 28-29. 
59   Wade and Forsyth (2000) at 87. 
60   See IGIS Annual Report at 27-28. 
61   C Kremmer (2002) “When ASIO calls …” Sydney Morning Herald, February 22, available at 
www.old.smh.com.au.  Some of the detail relating to this complaint is also presented in the IGIS Annual 
Report at 44. 
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These types of complaints do not necessarily fit into the regular formal moulds for 
investigation, but are nonetheless real.62  “A humane system of government must 
provide some way of assuaging them, both for the sake of justice and because 
accumulating discontent is a serious clog on administrative efficiency in a 
democratic country.”63  It is not adequate to say that these sorts of matters can be 
constitutionally dealt with through complaints made to Members of Parliament which 
then become a parliamentary question.64  Mediation offers a way to address these 
complaints effectively for the benefit of both the agency and the complainant.  
 
Part 4:  Positive Aspects of Mediating Complaints About Intelligence 
Organisations  
 
There are many significant positive aspects of the mediation model proposed here 
for the resolution of complaints relating to the AIC.  These advantages exist for both 
the relevant agencies and the complainants and are discussed below in terms of 
these two perspectives.  The advantages also exist in terms of the perspective of the 
promotion of democratic and just administrative practices of government, as noted 
above.  This is particularly important in the current environment where Australia’s 
Intelligence organisations require as much cooperation as possible from the public, 
not antagonism resulting from discontent about administrative practice.65  
 
4.1 Positive Aspects of Mediation for the AIC 
 
                                                 
62   Wade and Forsyth (2000) at 87. 
63   Wade and Forsyth (2000) at 87. 
64   Wade and Forsyth (2000) at 87. 
65    Discontent with the operations of Intelligence organisations is something that is, however, being 
promoted by aspects of the media – see for example, M Carlton (2002) “This Melodrama Can Get Right Up 
Your Nose” Sydney Morning Herald, November 2 available at www.smh.com.au/articles/2002;  J Kidman 
(2001) “ASIO Swoop in Hunt for bin Laden Link” Sydney Morning Herald September 30 available at 
www.old.smh.com.au/news; D Marr (2001) “Interrogation traumatic” Sydney Morning Herald, September 29 
available at www.old.smh.com.au/news.   A good example of effective cooperation with the community was 
the community contact program developed by ASIO in the lead up to the 2000 Sydney Olympics. 
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From an organisation’s perspective, the key advantage of the mediation process is 
that it enables their representative to communicate the agency’s responses to the 
complaint directly and effectively to the complainant.  Formal modes of inquiry and 
investigation simply do not offer an agency the opportunity to explain aspects of their 
activities, contextualise their conduct, or acknowledge minor improprieties.  In this 
way, the mediation process provides an opportunity to enhance the public view of 
organisational accountability.  
 
There are also the advantages of efficiency and speed.  Efficiency is achieved in 
terms of resources and time, and potential benefits exist for both the office of the 
IGIS and the relevant Intelligence organisation.66  That is, it is far less resource 
intensive for the office of the IGIS to devote an officer to an afternoon of mediation 
than to weeks of investigation and enquiry.  It is also far less resource intensive for 
an agency to prepare for a mediation than to respond to formal requests for briefings 
and memos in response to a complaint.  Further, where the parties are cooperative, 
a mediation can be organised within days, and this offers the consequential 
possibility of having the matter resolved in that time.   
 
It is also a benefit for agencies that the mediator under this model, being someone 
from the office of the IGIS, has a level of independence that is combined with a 
knowledge of the issues and the context of the dispute.  Whilst the mediator’s role is 
proposed to be one of low level intervention on matters relating to the substance of 
the complaint, the flexibility of the process can allow for their expertise to be drawn 
on where appropriate.  This is a matter that warrants further consideration as the 
model is developed.67  
                                                 
66   Note that the only physical resources required for a mediation are a quiet room with tables and chairs 
and a whiteboard.  Access to tea, coffee, water and tissues is also usually required.  Moore, however, 
comments that the location needs to be neutral so that neither party has “strong emotional identification or 
physical control of the space.” CW Moore (1996) The Mediation Process Jossey-Bass Publisher:  San 
Francisco at 148.  Moore discusses issues to do with the physical arrangement of the setting further at 150 – 
152. 
67   Note that the issue of independence and neutrality on the part of a mediator is highly contentious.  See 
for example, H Astor (2000) “Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice – Part I”, 11 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 73, and R Field (2003) “The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in Mediation” 22(1) 
The Arbitrator and Mediator 79.  Confusion about this issue can be avoided if it is overtly addressed in the 
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The mediation model proposed here conforms to traditional principles of 
confidentiality and privacy.68  This is generally taken to mean that mediations are 
conducted behind closed doors, that no record of what is said is kept, and there is 
no disclosure outside the mediation context of documents relied on or of discussions 
that took place, unless both parties agree.   
 
Further, confidentiality is generally taken to ensure that mediation proceedings are 
conducted “without prejudice”.  That is, if a complainant decides to pursue a matter 
further, formally, they are unable to use what was said in the mediation in relation to 
those later proceedings.  This, we would suggest, is a significant benefit to an 
agency, as it can allow them a higher level of latitude to engage fully in discussions 
with the complainant.  As suggested above, security concerns specific to Intelligence 
organisations remain an issue for consideration.  However, the voluntary nature of 
mediation means that an agency can discontinue their participation in the process at 
any stage where it appears to the representative that it would be inappropriate to 
continue.  Further, any documents prepared by the agency for the purpose of the 
mediation would be protected by the confidentiality provisions of amendments to the 
Act and would not be able to be called for use in any later proceedings. 
 
Another benefit of mediation from an agency’s perspective is that it “can be directed, 
not toward cementing a relationship, but toward terminating it.”69  That is, through 
mediation, communication with the complainant can be achieved to a level where 
they have no interest in becoming a repeat complainant.  In this way, the mediation 
process has the potential to secure the complainant’s confidence, and prevent future 
complaints.  
                                                                                                                                                 
development of the mediation model for the IGIS and included in mediator training and guidelines.  Also, the 
parties must be fully advised at the beginning of the mediation as to the extent of the mediator’s role. 
68   See Boulle (1996) at 41, and Astor and Chinkin (2002) at 178 – 186.  Note however Codd’s comment 
that “the current case law would suggest that one should not assume confidentiality in mediation.”:  B Codd 
(2002) “The Confidential Mediator” 21(3) The Arbitrator and Mediator 35 at 36.  Our proposal is that any 
model of mediation developed for use by the office of the IGIS would have its confidentiality formally 
protected by amendments to the Act – see note 52 above.   
69   L Fuller, (1971) “Mediation” 44 Southern California Law Review 305 at 308. 
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In summary, agencies potentially have much to gain by participating in a mediation 
about a complaint against them.  They can save time and resources by having the 
issue dealt with expeditiously and effectively; they can uphold the integrity of the 
operations of their officers whilst also having a chance to acknowledge any 
deficiencies in agency practice or procedure; and they can do so in a confidential 
environment where their communications with the complainant are facilitated by a 
knowledgable independent.  
 
4.2 Positive aspects of Mediation for Complainants 
 
From the perspective of complainants, perhaps the most significant advantage is 
that they are able to put their issues directly to the relevant agency in a controlled 
environment.70  Complainants can feel – at least to a certain extent - that they 
contribute to the direction of discussions in the mediation and that their story and 
concerns have been heard.  They are also more likely, as a result of the personal 
connection they are able to make with a human representative of the relevant 
agency, to drop any pretences or hidden agendas they might bring to the mediation, 
and this allows discussions to be more open and constructive.71   
 
The complainant’s direct face-to-face participation and personal engagement in 
exploring the issues contributes to their overall satisfaction with the process, to an 
understanding of the agency’s point of view and to a commitment to any agreed 
outcomes.72  The fact that the process directly involves the complainant in arriving at 
a consensual outcome means that, for example, a verbal apology from the agency 
representative at the time of the mediation may be deemed sufficient and 
satisfactory to address their concerns.  This of course avoids any need for 
                                                 
70   Boulle (1996) at 37. 
71   See generally, for example, R Baruch Bush and J Folger (1994) The Promise of Mediation: Responding 
to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco.  See also Folberg and 
Taylor (1984) at 231 – 243 on the issue of uncovering hidden interests of the disputing parties. 
72  Moore (1996) at 309:  “Satisfaction can generally be correlated with compliance.”  See also, R Singer 
(1995) “The Rolling Stones Revisited: Exploring the Concept of User Satisfaction as a Measure of Success 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution” 6 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 77.  
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subsequent formal recommendations from the IGIS.  Even where the mediation 
results in a recognition that the complaint is without substance, the process itself is 
likely to result in greater satisfaction and closure for the complainant.   
 
The informal nature of the mediation process is another benefit to complainants and 
is closely linked to its flexibility.73  Informality in relation to mediation refers to “the 
setting, style and tone of the mediation and the interpersonal behaviour and conduct 
of the participants.”74  The mediation process specifically lacks mystique and ritual, 
and the language of the process is also natural and everyday.  This makes the 
process one that is easy for complainants to understand and creates a non-
threatening environment which is user-friendly.75  The flexibility of the process also 
means that it can take place at a convenient time and place for the complainant.  
 
A consequence of the informal nature of the process is that issues can be raised and 
discussed that might not necessarily be relevant to a formal investigation.76  For 
example, a complainant’s feelings and emotional responses to having their house 
raided can be acknowledged by the agency, discussed and explored.77  The process 
also provides the opportunity for complainants to contribute to a process of 
prioritising issues so that the discussions can cut straight to the core matters that are 
important to them.78  This might mean, for example, that an off-the-cuff offensive 
remark made by an agency officer during a raid is given priority as an issue to be 
resolved for the complainant over an issue of alleged damage to property.   
 
                                                 
73   Boulle (1996) at 36. 
74   Boulle (1996) at 36. 
75   Boulle (1996) at 36. 
76   Astor and Chinkin note that “The mediator seeks to ensure that the agenda is comprehensive, is based 
on the parties’ concerns rather than the ideas or concerns of the mediator, and is expressed in language 
which accurately identifies those concerns without expressing unproductive blaming or conflict.” (2002) at 
143. 
77   As Tillet comments:  “Feelings almost inevitably play an important part in conflict and conflict resolution, 
and the mediation process.  Resolutions that appear to involve no expression of feeling are usually those 
which will not succeed.” G Tillet (1991) Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach, Sydney: Sydney University 
Press at 58. 
78   See Folberg and Taylor for a discussion of the various methods for forming a constructive agenda: 
(1984) at 223-227. 
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Another advantage for complainants of the mediation model suggested here is its 
voluntary nature;79 that is, a complainant can terminate the process at any stage.  
This allows the assumption to be made that as long as the complainant remains in 
the mediation room, they are committed to discussing issues with a view to finding a 
resolution, as they are under no other compulsion to remain.  
 
As noted above, the mediation model proposed here conforms to traditional 
principles of confidentiality and privacy.  This is important for complainants for a 
number of reasons.  First, an assurance of confidentiality increases the likelihood 
that the complainant will be willing to engage in the process.80  Second, it allows 
complainants to feel that they can talk openly and honestly, without any fear of 
reprisal for what they say; and this enhances the effectiveness of the process.81  
Third, confidentiality works to suppress ulterior motives in terms of participation; that 
is, complainants cannot use the process as a ‘fishing expedition’ for intended later 
proceedings.82  And finally, their issues and concerns are kept out of the public eye, 
and they can therefore avoid undue attention and embarrassment.   
  
Another benefit is that speedier resolutions to complaints are possible because 
mediations can be organised quickly and, if they result in an agreement, avoid the 
need for a formal investigation.  Complainants are consequently more likely to feel 
that the system has been respectful of them by dealing with their concerns 
expeditiously.   
 
A final advantage of the mediation process for complainants is that participation in it 
does not preclude their turning to formal options if the mediation is not successful.  
 
                                                 
79   For a discussion of the arguments relating to voluntariness in mediation see Boulle (1996) at 15.  
Important to a model of truly voluntary mediation is that a party’s agreement to participate is free and 
informed.  
80   Astor and Chinkin (2002) at 178. 
81   Astor and Chinkin (2002) at 178, also referring to NSW Law Reform Commission, (1991) ADR – Training 
and Accreditation of Mediators, Report No.67, Sydney: NSWLRC at 63. 
82   Astor and Chinkin (2002) at 178. 
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Complainants, then, as well as agencies can clearly benefit from having their matter 
referred to mediation.  Not only do they have the chance to be heard by the relevant 
agency through their direct participation, but they also have the opportunity to better 
understand what happened and why.  Complainants can help determine the relevant 
issues to be discussed and the order of their priority and can also contribute to 
working out what needs to be done to resolve the complaint, and address their 
issues of concern.  This can all take place in an environment which is informal, 
flexible and relatively non-threatening where their privacy is assured and where their 
communications with the agency are facilitated by an independent authoritative 
mediator. 
 
Part 5 – A Critical Assessment of Mediation in the Context of the IGIS 
 
Mediation is a process that can potentially resolve many complaints in a very 
positive way — but it needs to be assessed critically.  Certainly, many proponents of 
mediation believe that its “advantages clearly outweigh its disadvantages."83  
Nevertheless there are some negative aspects of mediation that apply to the 
resolution of complaints, even where they are appropriate for the process.  Further, 
while there are certainly many possible advantages of mediation not all of them 
apply to all complaints or complainants.  For this reason the development of an 
appropriate screening process in the office of the IGIS will be essential to the 
success of mediation in this context. 
 
Justice Kirby has commented that it is important to avoid the mythology of 
mediation.84  The asserted benefits of mediation, discussed above, need therefore 
to be contextualised by a thorough consideration of theoretical and practical issues 
of concern.  These include: doubts as to whether the process can adequately 
safeguard the rights and interests of certain parties, particularly those who are at a 
                                                 
83  For example, PL Winks (1980-1981) "Divorce Mediation:  A Non-Adversary Procedure for the No-Fault 
Divorce" 19 Journal of Family Law 615 at 653. 
84  See Kirby (1994) at 146, G Tillet (1991) The Myths of Mediation The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Macquarie 
University, and GV Kurien, (1995) "Critique of Myths of Mediation" 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 43. 
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power disadvantage;85 questions about the institutionalisation of second-class 
justice based on economic exegiencies;86 the dependence of the process on the skill 
levels of the mediator;87 and the practical and real consequences of theoretical 
assertions relating to mediator independence and confidentiality in the mediation 
process.88   
 
It should also be noted, for example, that although mediation is ostensibly voluntary 
some complainants may feel forced to attend;89 although mediation should be 
flexible, some mediators are not skilled enough to cope with the process demands of 
the parties;90 some mediations take a very long time and are not speedy at all; some 
complainants may come to the process with strong patterns of destructive conflict 
resolution behaviour that are not possible to counter; some may have less respect 
for the outcome of mediation than for the result of a formal investigation; and if a 
mediation is handled badly it may compound the issues for the complainant and 
exacerbate the complaint.  In short, "it must be acknowledged that mediation is not a 
universal panacea."91
 
The authors propose to consider these issues, and their relevance to the resolution 
of AIC related complaints, in more detail in a second article.  However, one issue is 
particularly relevant to any mediation involving the AIC and warrants some 
elaboration here. 
 
                                                 
85  However, it has been said that "[t]hose involved [with the general interest in mediation] seem more fascinated 
with the concept than with its practical application.":  Charlesworth (1991) at 59. 
86   See for example, R Abel (ed) (1982) The Politics of Informal Justice, New York: Academic Press. 
87   As Tillet comments:  “The key variable in mediation is not the nature of the conflict or its participants.  It 
is the mediator, who must possess appropriate personal and process skills.”: G Tillet (1991) Resolving 
Conflict: A Practical Approach, Sydney: Sydney University Press at 51. 
88   See notes 52 and 67 above. 
89   Boulle comments that there are “gradations of voluntariness”: (1996) at 16.  This means that a choice to 
participate may not reflect a genuine willingness to attend. 
90 Kurien refers to the parties reliance on the mediator’s ability to "adapt the process to suit the individual needs 
of the parties in conflict": G Kurien (1995) “Critique of the Myths of Mediation” 6 Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 43 at 50.  Mediator skills in this regard are not always consistent in standard, although thorough training 
procedures and continuing skill evaluation can address some of the issues that arise in this context. 
91   Charlesworth (1991) at 60. 
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A major concern about mediation relates to its use in situations where there is a 
power imbalance between the parties.  This is because in mediation both parties 
need to be able to negotiate on their own behalf effectively, and if there is a power 
imbalance one party will have a negotiating advantage that will almost certainly 
result in the outcome being (perhaps unfairly) in their favour.  In terms of mediations 
conducted by the IGIS, a clear power imbalance exists between the complainant and 
the agency.  That is, the agency representative, coming from a government  
organisation with considerable authority and legislative power, has significant 
potential to dominate discussions and overbear or intimidate the complainant.  This 
sort of intimidation is not necessarily always overt and yet can impact strongly on the 
outcome of the process. 
 
It is also worth noting, in particular, that there are often potential cultural issues 
that impact on the balance of power between the complainant and the relevant 
agency.  For example, some of the people that the AIC deals with originate from 
countries where security organisations are not monitored and have enormous 
power. These organisations are consequently a source of fear, and this fear can 
be translated to a complainant’s discussions with an agency in the mediation 
environment. 
 
If issues of power imbalance are openly acknowledged, however, prior to the 
development of the IGIS model of mediation, then they can be addressed to some 
extent by ensuring that the mediator has an ability to intervene in the process when 
the existence of a power imbalance seems to be impacting on the complainant’s 
ability to engage in the process effectively.  On a practical level, for example, a 
mediator can use strategies such as breaks from discussions, or private sessions, in 
order to assist the complainant to regain their composure or to give them quiet time 
to consider proposed options for resolving the complaint.92   
 
                                                 
92   See for example, AM Davis and RA Salem (1984) “Dealing with Power Imbalances in the Mediation of 
Interpersonal Disputes” 6 Mediation Quarterly 17. 
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A complicating factor here, however, is that mediator interventions on behalf of the 
complainant can be argued as compromising their independence, and this can 
potentially undermine a key benefit of the process.  Nevertheless, the flexibility of the 
mediation process allows for accommodations to be made in this regard, and as 
long as the participants are fully informed about what is appropriate mediator 
conduct, problems can be avoided.  It is important, for example, for the participants 
to be clear that whilst mediators may be able to control aspects of the process to 
assist them, they are not in a position to advise complainants of their legal rights, or 
to assess for them the relative merits of a particular proposal or option.  It is also 
important that complainants are advised before the mediation commences that they 
should seek independent legal advice if they are unsure of, or concerned about, the 
legal consequences of any of the issues or proposals discussed.  
 
Despite the possible negative aspects of the use of mediation in the context of 
complaints about the AIC, there is much to be said for considering a trial program.  
The next section provides a brief case study to illustrate how the process might work 
in practice to resolve an appropriate complaint. 
 
Part 6 – A Case Study 
 
ASIO is perhaps an agency for which the model of mediation proposed in this article 
is particularly suitable.  This is because, as the IGIS has noted, “as ASIO is 
principally a domestic security agency, it is the agency most likely to come into 
contact with members of the Australian public.”93
 
The following detail of a complaint against ASIO that shows potential for the use of 
mediation is taken from the IGIS’s Annual Report for 2001-2002:94
 
The Complaint:  
                                                 
93   IGIS Annual Report at 31. 
94   IGIS Annual Report at 44. 
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The IGIS received a complaint from the mother of a university student interviewed by 
ASIO.  The interview was viewed by ASIO as routine. The complainant was 
concerned, however, about the agency’s practice in terms of organising the interview, 
where an ASIO officer obtained a contact number from a family member without 
declaring he was from the organisation.  The complainant was also concerned about 
the conduct of the interview itself (which she attended with her son), where she said 
they both felt intimidated and threatened by the ASIO officers. 
 
The IGIS concluded that the ASIO officers involved were not clear on how the 
activity related to ASIO’s statutory responsibilities.  The Director General of ASIO, 
Dennis Richardson, had similar concerns and assured the IGIS that he had already 
taken action to avoid a re-occurrence and “to remind ASIO officers seeking 
assistance from the public that they must ensure their activities are at all times 
consistent with ASIO’s roles and functions and sensitive to community concerns.”95 
 
A Mediated Approach: 
 
This is a complaint that predominantly involves issues of agency practice and 
procedure.  It would be suitable for a mediated approach to its resolution because 
the concerns do not involve any illegal conduct on the part of the agency, or any 
issues of a particularly sensitive nature.  Rather, the issues centre on insensitive 
officer conduct and a lack of clarity on the part of the officers involved about the 
purpose of the exercise in which they were engaged, and how that exercise related 
to ASIO’s statutory functions.   
 
In a mediated environment, an ASIO representative would be able to directly 
acknowledge the officers’ insensitivities and discuss the general role of ASIO and 
the nature of its authority and powers in terms of consulting with the community.  
The representative would be able to contextualise the exercise that involved the 
                                                 
95   IGIS Annual Report at 44. 
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complainant’s family, and explain the agency’s concern with groups who engage in 
issue motivated violence.  The representative could also assure the complainant that 
ASIO is not concerned with making inquiries into community attitudes generally, and 
(if appropriate, as it was in this case) assure the complainant that “ASIO had, and 
has, no ongoing interest in her son or other members of her family and does not 
keep a file or dossier on him.”96  Other aspects of ASIO’s usual practice and 
procedure could also be explained, for example, that ASIO representatives do not 
usually identify themselves as ASIO officers to third parties, and that one of the 
reasons for this practice is to “protect the confidentiality of people with whom ASIO 
has contact.”97 
 
For the complainant, perhaps the most significant issue was the feeling of fear and 
intimidation she and her son experienced in their contact with the organisation.  
Mediation would provide her with an opportunity to discuss the extent and impact of 
these feelings with the agency representative.  The agency representative could 
directly acknowledge the complainant’s experience and assure her that “ASIO had 
no intention of intimidating her son, or investigating his legitimate protest 
activities.”98
 
With these issues carefully explored, using the process detailed in Part 2 above, 
the complainant and the agency representative would be in a position to move to 
a resolution of the matter.  It is likely that for the complainant a verbal apology 
and statement of reassurance that ASIO has no ongoing interest in her son or 
family would be sufficient.  It might also be the case that the agency 
representative could assure the complainant that the agency will look to review 
their community consultation procedures. 
 
At the conclusion of the mediation the mediator would write, with the assistance 
of the participants, a summary of what had been agreed and this would form the 
                                                 
96   IGIS Annual Report at 44 - these were issues explained by the IGIS to the complainant. 
97   IGIS  Annual Report at 44. 
98   IGIS Annual Report at 44. 
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basis of a brief report to the IGIS on the issues addressed in the mediation and 
the outcomes of the process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that there is much potential for the use of mediation in the 
resolution of complaints about the AIC.  The benefits of mediation, when applied 
to appropriate cases, extend from resource savings for both the IGIS and 
agencies to broader issues of public interest promotion and increased 
accountability of Intelligence organisations. In the current security environment it 
is likely that complaints to the IGIS against the AIC will increase.  These 
complaints need to be resolved in a way that maintains public confidence in, and 
promotes accountability of, the AIC.  Current formal inquiries are thorough but 
resource intensive, and exclude the direct participation of the relevant agency 
and the complainant.  The introduction of mediation into the complaints resolution 
practice of the office of the IGIS offers the potential to address these issues with 
advantages to complainants, agencies and the office itself.   
 
Moving the IGIS’ complaints resolution practice forward in this way will be critical 
to Australia’s acceptance of a higher public profile for the AIC in this Century. 
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